Same payload, inside the cell
Three hostile actions. Three different walls. Nothing changed but the cage.
QuantmLayer runs the agent inside a least-privilege cell built from Linux kernel primitives. Below, an exact stand-in for that supply-chain payload runs uncontained, then inside a cell — with no change to the payload itself.
wall 01 — filesystem
Secrets aren't hidden. They're absent.
SSH, cloud, and token credentials don't exist inside the cell — a read returns “no such file,” not “permission denied.”
cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa → no such file
wall 02 — network
Egress is default-deny.
No route leaves the cell except what a profile allow-lists. Exfiltration and C2 can't even resolve a host.
curl unlisted-host → blocked
wall 03 — exec
Only approved binaries run.
Content-verified by hash (BPF-LSM). A dropped payload binary is denied at execve — its hash was never approved.
./dropped-daemon → denied
wall 04 — audit
Provable after the fact.
Every run commits its governing policy to a hash chain. Edit one record and it breaks — third-party-verifiable evidence.
audit verify → intact
